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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, 
INC., dba W ARSHAW'S GIANT 
FOODS AND GRAND CENTRAL 
DRUGS, INC. 
Def end ants-Respondents, 
and 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
\ Case No. 
11034 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I. 
THE OPINION OF THE COURT IS IN ERROR IN 
CITING THE CASE OF STATE V. POTELLO, 40 
UTAH 56, 119 P. 1023, AS HOLDING THAT "THE 
LEGISLATURE HAS SIMPLY DECLARED IT UN-
FAIR TO ACCOMPLISH IT [CAPTURE A COMPET-
ITOR'S BUSINESS] THROUGH GIVING AWAY 
GOODS OR SERVICES OR SELLING THEM FOR 
LESS THAN COST." 
4 
On page 5 of the opm1on, and in footnote 23, the 
Court indicates that the Utah Supreme Court has spoken 
with regard to selling goods at less than cost. In support 
of this proposition the Court cites State v. Potello, 40 
Utah 56, 119 P. 1023 (1911). 1'his citation is completely 
in error since the Potello case was a horse theft case and 
had nothing at all to do with sales below cost. In that 
case the defendant was convicted of stealing a horse, 
which under the statutes at that time was grand larceny. 
'Phe holding of the case in essence is that the prima 
facia provisions involved in the statute there in question 
were not unreasonable and hence were not unconstitu-
tional. Since the opinion is in such obvious error in this 
n•gard, it is submitted that the Court should rehear the 
rnatter and make a proper determination based upon 
correct principles of law. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT IN THE PREVIOUS OPINION MADE 
A COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS READING OF THE 
RECORD IN THIS CASE REGARDING A LIMITA-
TION OF QUANTITY ON THE SALE OF LEE MEN'S 
PANTS BY DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, GRAND 
CENTRAL. 
Ou Page 6 of the opinion the Court states with 
n•gard to the presumption of intent from a limitation 
of qua11tity that 
En·11 tlw most simpl<' anal~·sis would then lead all 
reasonahh• pernons to conclude that the respond-
Pnts had an intt•nt h.'· this activity to attract cus-
omers into the ston· upon the expectation that 
tll('v would pnrrhast~ other items not marked 
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bel?~ cost. Nor can the resvondents explain this 
activity on the basis of an overstock of merchan-
dise, since the limitation is inconsistent with a 
motive to clear aid cin oversupply of of stock. If 
such were the intent they should be anxious to 
sell as much of the stock as possible to each cus-
tomer. (Emphasis added). 
The Court is in error in holding that there was a 
limitation of quantity on the sale of Lee men's pants. 
It is easy to see how the Court could be misled in this 
matter since the intervenor appellants in their brief make 
a similar statement. (Brief of Intervenor Appellants, 
p. 42) However, both the Court and intervenor-appellant 
based their argument upon an erroneous transcript which 
was corrected in the record certified on appeal. 
Upon discovery of an error in the transcript of the 
proceeding in the lower court, counsel for defendant-
respondent Grand Central, moved to correct the tran-
script. This motion was not opposed. An order correct-
ing the record was entered by the Judge of the trial court 
and certified to the Supreme Court as part of the record 
on appeal in conformity with the provisions of Rule 
75(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The transcript of the trial in the matter, at page 25 
line 29, (R. 76) contains the 011ly evidence available 
regarding quantity limitations on Lee pants. This evi-
dence is in the form of the following question propounded 
to Mr. Keith Warshaw, one of the officers of defendant-
respondent Grand Central Stores, Inc. by Mr. Yeates, 
counsel for def endant-respomle11t and ~Jr. "Warshaw 's 
answer thereto : 
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"Q. On this sale of Lee pants, two for $5.00, did 
yon limit that snpvly to any one customer? 
A. Yes." 
The actual response to this question as given by Mr. 
\Varshaw was "no." Upon motion by counsel for de-
fendant-respondent Grand Central, this error in the 
transcript was corrected to accurately reflect the re-
sponse. (R. 186-188) 
The Court, in its opinion, assumed that there was 
a limitation of quantity involved with the sale of Lee 
men's pants on the part of the defendant-respondent 
Grand Central and from such a limitation presumed an 
intent to injure competition or destroy competition con-
trary to the act. Such a presumption is allowed by 
§ 13-5-9 (2) Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1962). Based 
npon this presumption, the Court overruled the lower 
Court's finding that there was no "intent to induce the 
purchase of other merchandise, to unfairly divert trade 
from a competitor, or to otherwise injure a competitor" 
involved in this sale as being inconsistent with the evi-
dence. This is clearly erroneous. A correct reading of 
th<:> record will not uphold the opinion of the court. Since 
there was no limitation of quantity involved in the sale 
the finding of the trial court that there was no intent 
to unfairly divert trade or injure a competitor is not 
contradicted by the evidence. ·without a finding of in-
tent or a presumption of intent there could be no violation 
of tlw act in the sale of Lee men's pants, 2 pair for 
$5.00. The sale was merely to reduce inventory. 
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By this error the Supreme Court has sustained one 
cause of action against defendant-respondent which 
could not be sustained on a proper reading of the record. 
'l'he Court should rehear the matter and decide it upon 
a correct application of the facts as develorwd at the 
trial. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CITATION OF THE 
CASE OF ROBERT H. HINCKLEY INC. V. STATE 
TAX COMM., 17 UTAH 2d 70, 404 P.2d 662, (1965) IN 
SUPPORT OF THE PROPOSITION THAT "THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE IS NOT 
TO BE DECIDED ON QUESTIONS OF INCONVEN-
IENCE, OR DIFFICULTY IN APPLICATION OF A 
COST ST AND ARD." 
The case of Robert H. Hinckley Inc. '0. State Tax 
Comm. 17 Utah 2d 70, 404 P.2d 662 (19G5) was a case 
involving sales tax collectjons on sales through vending 
machines. The defendant argued that since he could 
not collect the tax from the person who purchased 5¢ 
and 10¢ items from his vending machines, he therefore 
should not have to pay the retail sales tax. The Conrt 
in that case held that under the statute in question de-
fendant had to remit the tax whether or not he could 
collect it on each sale. The case had nothing to do with 
sales below cost, and had nothing to do with the applica-
tion of any. cost standard. 
On rehearing the Court should apply the correct 
principles of law as set forth fnlly in the Brief of De-
fendant-Respondent heretofore filed at pages 9-21. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CASE OF BURT V. WOOLSULATE, 106 UTAH 156, 
146 P.2d 203, (1944) SUPPORTS THE PROPOSITION 
THAT "MOREOVER THE OVERWHELMING 
WEIGHT OF THE MORE RECENT JUDICIAL DE-
CISIONS HAS BEEN IN FAVOR OF SUCH [SALES 
BELOW COST] LEGISLATION." 
The case of Burt v. Woolsulate, 106 Utah 156, 146 
P.2d 203, ( 1944) was an action for breach of contract. 
AR a defense to a breach of contract defendant argued 
that the contract violated the Fair Trade Act, since 
declared unconstitution as a price fixing act, and the 
"LittlP Robinson-Patman" provisions of the Utah Unfair 
Practices Act. [Section 13-5-3, Utah Code Ann. (Repl. 
Vol. 1962)] The defendant had contracted with the plain-
tiff to sell him certain goods at $32.50 per ton. As a 
<lPfrnse to refusal to sell at this price defendant stated 
that this price was much less than the price being charged 
to ohu people, therefore, it was a discrimination under 
the "Little Robinson-Patman" provision of the Utah Un-
fair Practices Act. Nowhere in the case was there ever 
any allegation of a sale below cost. Defendant was not 
trying to justify his refusal to sell on the fact that this 
would ht> a sale below cost. The sale below cost provi-
~ionR of the Unfair Practices Act ·were not even men-
tioned in the case. Further, in deciding the case the 
eourt did not pass upon the constitutionality of any stat-
ute since the case was decided on the holding that the 
diallenged acts (The Fair Trade Act and the Little 
Hobinson-Patman provisions of the Unfair Practices 
Act) did not even apply. On page 206 the court stated: 
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But at this timP WP f>Xpr0ss no oprmon on its 
constitutionality. The contract is not violative 
of the unfair praetict's act. 
There is no citation of authority in the Burt case 
regarding the validity or invalidity of Sale Below Cost 
statutes at all. The case itself does not decide the con-
stitutionality of the Utah act and in fact explicitly states 
that the act does not apply. Therefore, it is submitted 
that the Court is in complete error in its statement as 
to the holding of this case. A rehearing should bP had 
on the matter and this case should be determined on cor-
rect principles of law as set forth in the Brief of Df•-
f endant-Respondent heretfore filed at page 29-57. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT rs IN ERROR IN ITS HOLDING THAT 
GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. V. THRIFTY SALES, 5 
UT AH 2<l 326, 301 P .2d 7 41, (1956) IS DISTINGUISH-
ABLE AND NOT CONTROLLING IN THE CASE AT 
BAR. 
The case of General Electric Co. I". Thrifty Salrs 
Inc., 5 Utah 2d 326, 301 P.2d 741, was a case involving 
the Utah Fair Trade Act and especially ~ 6 of that Aet 
which provided: 
"Wjlfnll~- and knowing!» adwrtising, offering for ' 
salt> or sPlling any cornmodity at less than tlw 
price sti1mlakd in any ocntract entPred into pur-
suant to tlw provisions of this Act, whether the 
person so adz:ertising, off"ering for sale or s_rl_l-
ing is or is not a porty to .-:nch co11tract, is unfair 
competition and is adionahl<' at tlw sllit of any 
iwrson <larnagt'd tlwrf'h;.·. l ".C.A. 1953, 13-4-(i." 
General Elr'ctric v. Thrifty Sales, l11c., Sl/}Jrrt al 
742. (Ernpliasis h;.· th(• Court). 
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Defendant contended that this Act was unconstitu-
tional as a violation of Article XII ~ 20 of the Utah 
Constitution in that it was in fact a price fixing statute. 
In deciding the questions the court pointed out a signifi-
cant distinction between the federal anti-trust acts and 
the act involved in that case stating that the federal acts 
were merely legislative enactments 
whereas our anti-price fixing prov1s10n is our 
constitution, which must prevail over any statu,... 
tory e·nactment inconsistent herewith, however 
laudable or desirable, or however wise or even 
necessary for the public welfare such legislation 
may seem. General Electric Co., v. Thrifty Sales, 
I 11c., supra at 748. (Emphasis added). 
'rhe Court stated that even the plaintiff, there trying 
to enforce the Fair Trade Act, would have to concede 
that retailers could not lawfully enter into voluntary con-
tracts with others to fix the prices of plaintiff's products 
because this would be horizontal price fixing and con-
trary to the statutes and the Utah Constitution. The 
Conrt went on to state: 
However, even though they may not so deal with 
each other, the act furnishes them a device by 
which thev can readily combine to fix prices by 
nse of the. producer or manufacturer as an inter-
mediary. General Electric v. Thrifty Sales, Inc. 
supra at 751. 
In the use of the non-signer clause the legislature had 
provided that one manufacturer and one retailer could 
e>nter into an agr<:>Pment and thereby fix the price for 
this item throughout tlw area, <:>n'n as to persons not 
]Jarties to the agreement. It is submitted that the pro-
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vision involved in the General Electric case is enn less 
objectionable than the provisions of the Unfair Practices 
Act challenged here by defendants. Under the sale below 
cost provisions of the Act there need not be an inter-
mediary as there was in the Fair Trade Act. By setting 
the minimum price or the presumed price at cost plus 
six percent the legislature has in effect fixed the price 
of these goods. Intervenor appellants have combined 
together in order to enforce the act and as sitch are 
attempting to set and fix prices at a niininwm of cost 
plus six percent. This has been held to violate federal 
anti-trust laws. United States v. Connecticid Food Coun-
cil, Inc., 1940-1943 Trade Cases iT 56, 167 [D. Conn. 19M]; 
United States v. Massach1tsetts Food Council, 1940-1943 
Trade Cases iT 56, 165 [D. Mass. 1941]; United States 
r. Rhode Island Food Council, Inc. 1940-1943 Tradr 
Cases iT 56, 175 [D.R.I. 1941]. 
It should he noted that in the General Electric case 
the Court held the Fair Trade Act unconstitutional and 
held that it would be unconstitutional even if it wen• for 
a salutary purpose as contended by the plaintiff stating: 
The difficult,\· with this t_\-pe of "price fixing" 
here }n question, cre11 if it ?Cc1·1' for thr salidary 
vurpose co 11tended liy thr z;la inti ff' whether 1t 
be a little or a lot, is that it is a violation of our 
constitution. It is like sin: a little sin if pro1wrl:· 
so classified, is jnst as definitely sin as a great 
quantity of it, and hardly to h~ approved undc.r 
the pretext that it is so small m amount that ~t 
can really be regarded as virtw'. General Elcctr'.c 
Co. v. Thrifty Sales, s11pra at 751. (Emphasis 
added.) 
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It should be noted that the provision under attack in 
the General Electric case was a legislative provision 
- the non-signer clause providing a binding effect upon 
persons not varties to the fair trade contract. Thus it 
was a legislative enacment there under attack, not any 
price fixing arrangement by manufacturers and retailers. 
'rhe same is true in the instant case. It is a legislative 
macment which makes it possible for certain retailers 
to enforce a six percent markup on goods and thus fix 
minimum prices. It is submitted that the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Ellett should have been followed and 
is the correct statement of the law as it now stands in 
this state. Rehearing should be granted and the case 
shonld be decided on correct principles of law as set 
forth in the Brief of defendant-respondent heretofore 
filed at pages 29-57. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "IT DOES 
NOT LIE WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT 
TO PASS UPON THE WISDOM, THE NEED OR 
DESIRABILITY OF ANY LEGISLATION, NOR TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO OPPOSING POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHIES." 
The Comt in making the above quoted holding at 
page 4 of its previous opinion made no citation of anthor-
itirs in ::mpport of the proposition. It is submitted that 
the proposition is entirrly i11correct. In the case of Pride 
Oil Company v. Salt Lake Coimty, 13 Utah 2d 183, 370 
P.2d 85;) ( 1962) a statute in the :\1otor Vehicle Code pro-
vidinir for a limitation on certain advertising practices 
t'l 
l'Plah'd to sales of motor fnels was held to be nnconstitn-
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tional. In making that decision the Court made the fol-
lowing statement: 
. For the purpose of analysis of the problem 
it can be assumed that there may be some eYils of 
the type urged by the appellant. But the first ob-
servation to be made is that we arc not persuaded 
that. they are either so grave or so seriously af-
f ecting the public interest as to justify the meas-
ures proposed for their correction. The second and 
more imporant one is that 1U' see 110 real likeli-
hood that the restrictions they place on the size 
and locations of signs will ma.fcrially aid in polic-
ing and preventing deception of the public. Pridr 
Oil Co. r. Salt Lake County, supra at 356. (Em-
phasis added). 
Despitt> avt>rnwnts and innuendos to tin' 
effect that the latter are in the long run inimical ' 
to the public interest, ire arc not com:inced that 
they pose any such dan9er to the public as would 
'Warrant i111;asio11 of the constitutio11al rights ol 
thP complaining dealers. One of tlw basic tenants 
of our system is that free and open competition is • 
a wholesome, stimulating force in our economy, 
Pride Oil Co. i:. Fi'nlt Lake County, supra at 357. > 
(Emphasis added). 
Using the abov(:> qnote-d statements the Court held 
that the act was unconstitutional. In so doing it clearly 
considered whether or not the act "-as bc>neficial, anrl 
the economic and social purposes of the act. 
It is submitted that tlH' Court <>rred in refm>ing to , 
pass upon the economic effrct of thP act and in refnsin~ 
to pass upon whether or not tlw act accornplisJwd thl' 
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purpose set out for it by the legislatiure, without unduly 
invading defendant's constitutional rights. 
rrherefore, this Court should grant a rehearing and 
in passing upon the constitutionality of the sale belo\v 
cost provisions of the Unfair Practices Act should con-
sider whether or not the act accomplishes the purpose 
stated for it and whether or not the burden imposed by 
the act outweights any possible good which can come 
from it. See Brief of defendant-respondent at pages 
31-33. 
CONCLUSION 
The errors of fact and law made m the Court's 
previous opinion prejudice this defendant and tend to 
create confusion in this area of the law. For the reasons 
hereinbefore set forth defendant-respondent petitions 
the Court to grant a rehearing in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & 
MANGUM 
ROBERT M. YEATES 
DENIS R. MORRILL 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Grand Central 
Stores, Inc., dba \Varshaw's 
Giant Foods and Grand 
Central Drugs, Inc. 
15 
